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ARTICLE 
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INVESTMENT COURT 
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ABSTRACT 
Foreign direct investment is an essential aspect of our global 
economy, yet the legitimacy of the current investment arbitral system 
is currently being undermined due to an alleged perception of a lack of 
arbitrator independence and a growing number of inconsistent and 
conflicting investment decisions, leading to an incoherent body of 
international investment law. Unpredictability in either investor 
protection or state liability leads to increased risk in the investment 
regime, and risk lowers foreign investment flows. Additionally, large 
awards against states have led to some countries refusing to consent to 
investor-state arbitration at all. 
This Article intends to promote the creation of a World Investment 
Court. This World Investment Court would increase consistency in the 
investment regime and remove the perception that investment 
arbitrators are biased towards investors, thereby promoting the 
legitimacy of international investment law overall. This Article further 
provides a look at inconsistent investment arbitral awards, and argues 
that even though many arbitrators cite prior awards, the current 
alleged de facto precedent is inadequate, and a “World Investment 
Court” is necessary for the further development of international 
investment law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (“FDI”) has grown dramatically within 
the past several decades, and with it, the number of investor-state 
disputes has risen. Because of the significant political risk taken by 
investors in foreign states, promoting and protecting FDI requires a 
judicial institution that can reduce risk to foreign investment and create 
a consistent body of international investment law.1 FDI continues to be 
generally unregulated on a global scale,2 and without this multilateral 
cohesion, bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) have emerged as the 
primary source of regulation for FDI. 3 At the start of 2016, there were 
over 3,300 international investment treaties in the world, with more 
than 2,900 BITs, and that number continues to grow.4 Concurrently, 
the number of investor-state disputes has risen to over 600,5 leading 
many—including the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 6 —to 
criticize the current investment arbitral system and call for solutions to 
its structural problems,7 specifically the numerous inconsistent arbitral 
decisions, the incoherent body of investment law, and alleged lack of 
independence and impartiality of investment arbitrators.8 
States have several types of dispute resolution methods that can 
be used to resolve investor-state disputes: (1) “diplomatic” means such 
as negotiation, mediation, diplomacy, and conciliation, and (2) “legal” 
means such as arbitration and judicial settlement.9 However, investor-
state arbitration is unique and distinct from many other forms of 
                                                                                                                       
1. STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 3 (2009). 
2 . José E. Alvarez, The Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 2 (2003). 
3. See generally Rachel J. Anderson, Toward Global Corporate Citizenship: Reframing 
Foreign Direct Investment Law, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009). 
4.  U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, World Investment Report 2016,  
101. 
5.  U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, World Investment Report 2015, 
114 (2015). See also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008), 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 
1369, 1389 (2009) (book review). 
6.  World Investment Report 2015, supra note 5, at 120 (asserting “[t]he question is not 
about whether to reform or not, but about the what, how and extent of such reform.”). 
7. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Toward A Minimalist System of International Investment 
Law?, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 303, 318 (2009) (citing scholars who have called for 
a World Investment Court). 
8. STEPHAN W. SCHILL, REFORMING INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS): 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND OPTIONS FOR THE WAY FORWARD 1 (2015). 
9. See generally J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (5th ed. 2011). 
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adjudication. 10  International commercial arbitration and investment 
arbitration present different questions to the tribunal,11 as arbitrators in 
commercial arbitration must decide whether there was a breach of the 
underlying contract while arbitrators in investment arbitration must 
decide the legality of states’ actions regarding foreign investments. 
Essentially, investor-state arbitration is a form of public law12 as it 
involves deciding investment regulatory disputes between states and 
private investors and is significantly distinct from private commercial 
international arbitration, which consists of resolving private disputes 
between private parties.13 But in international public law, while there 
is a WTO to regulate and promote coordinated trade policies, there is 
no supranational organization to regulate or promote international 
investment. 14  To compound the issue, the proliferation of BITs 
continues to cause numerous structural problems, particularly 
inconsistent interpretations of treaty language and an incoherent body 
of investment arbitral law. 15  Given the recent growth and rising 
importance of FDI to the international financial world, there is an 
increasing need for the establishment of a permanent World Investment 
Court to create consistent investment decisions leading to a coherent 
body of international investment law, and thereby protect and regulate 
the growing regime of FDI.16 
This Article analyzes and promotes the creation of a World 
Investment Court to resolve international investor-state disputes. One 
                                                                                                                       
10. Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Toward a More Exact 
Science, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 196, 196 n.1 (2012). 
11 . See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija SA v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶  96, 113 (July 3, 2002). 
12. See William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law 
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 283-
96 (“[M]uch of investment treaty arbitration today must be understood as public regulatory or 
administrative law.” Id. at 289); see also Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment 
Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law 
Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 61 (2011). 
13. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 4 (2007). 
14 . Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward A Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 287 (1997) (noting “The term ‘supranational’ 
has no canonical definition but is typically used to identify a particular type of international 
organization that is empowered to exercise directly some of the functions otherwise reserved to 
states.”). 
15. Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multi-
lateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303, 340 (2009). 
16. Id. at 335. 
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scholar has proposed the idea of a World Investment Court in the past,17 
while most scholars have criticized the proposal.18 The hope of this 
Article is to reinvigorate the discussion surrounding the proposal for a 
World Investment Court, and attempt to persuade critics that a Court 
composed under the auspices of the WTO and comprised of tenured 
judges appointed by the WTO contracting states would create a more 
perfect system to resolve international investment disputes. As 
discussed here, this World Investment Court would create a more 
consistent interpretation of international investment treaties and 
standardize international investment law, which in turn may increase 
FDI flows due to improved confidence in investment protection19 and 
provide states with a predictable framework to base future regulatory 
actions.20 It is important to note that this Article will not focus on the 
claim that the current investment arbitral system is inadequate—though 
it may be in some respects—but the aim of this Article is to propose a 
more complete and coherent system to resolve international investment 
disputes. Furthermore, this Article will discuss a current attempt to 
place this theory into practice—namely the bilateral investment courts 
under EU investment treaties. 
Part II of this Article will describe the current regulatory 
framework of FDI, particularly BITs and FTAs as these are the most 
prevalent agreements relating to investment. Part III will discuss the 
current enforcement mechanisms for investment arbitral awards. Part 
IV will focus on the reasons investment arbitration may not be the best 
forum for deciding investor-state disputes, and will also discuss the 
conflicts between the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state in 
                                                                                                                       
17. VAN HARTEN, supra note 13, at 180-84. Yet even this scholar is starting to back away 
from his idea of an international investment court due to a growing pessimistic view of practical 
implementation. Gus Van Harten, The System of International Investment, in ALTERNATIVE 
VISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH 103, 104-05 (C.L. Lim ed., 2016). 
18. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law. By Gus Van 
Harten, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 909, 914 (2008) (book review); Stephen W. Schill, The European 
Commission’s Proposal of an “Investment Court System” for TTIP: Stepping Stone or 
Stumbling Block for Multilateralizing International Investment Law?, 20 AMER. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
9 (2016). 
19. Cf. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and 
the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 347 (2007) (noting 
“[t]here is mixed anecdotal evidence that investment treaties promote FDI.”). 
20. Christina Binder, Necessity Expectations, the Argentine Crisis and Legitimacy 
Concerns, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMON CONCERNS 198, 208 
(Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2013) (noting that unpredictability and unclear guidelines are 
detrimental to both states and investors). 
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delegating its power to a supranational organization such as this 
investment court. Next, Part V will look to the empirical value of the 
proposed investment court between the United States and the European 
Union, including critiques of the system. Part VI will discuss several 
arguments against the World Investment Court and provide responses 
to these criticisms. Part VII will then discuss the structure and function 
of the proposed World Investment Court, including its jurisdiction, 
appellate body, and precedential treatment. 
II. CURRENT REGULATION OF FDI 
First, to understand the reasons for this proposal of a World 
Investment Court, it is necessary to understand the current system of 
FDI regulation and its dispute resolution in the international sphere. 
FDI is generally defined as: “a category of cross-border investment 
made by a resident in one economy (the direct investor) with the 
objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct 
investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of 
the direct investor.”21 The central purpose of FDI is for the direct 
investor to acquire influence in the management of the foreign 
enterprise, generally evidenced by the ownership of at least ten percent 
of the voting power.22  This definition covers a broad spectrum of 
activities, as FDI can be created in many ways, such as establishing a 
manufacturing plant or expanding an existing business into a foreign 
state through a joint venture with a local company of that state.23 
Commonly, FDI occurs through a merger or acquisition of an existing 
firm, but FDI can also occur through the creation of a wholly new 
enterprise in a foreign country.24 
However, states and foreign investors—often companies or 
enterprises25—do not have the same international status, and therefore, 
have unequal bargaining power.26 Because investors of one country 
                                                                                                                       
21. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ¶ 11, at 17 (4th ed. 2008). 
22. Id. 
23. LONE WANDAHL MOUYAL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE RIGHT TO 
REGULATE: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 6 (2016). 
24. José E. Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing International 
Investment 15 (2011). 
25. DAVID COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 18 
(2017). 
26. STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: STUDIES IN ARBITRATION 
BETWEEN STATES AND PRIVATE PERSONS 386 (1990). 
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and a foreign state in which that investor owns or manages a business 
have different levels of bargaining power, many investors see FDI as 
risky.27 This political risk generally includes the risk of civil unrest, 
such as armed conflicts, and the risk of changing laws, regulations, or 
state administrations. 28  Before the twentieth century, FDI was 
protected primarily through diplomatic means, 29  but as threats of 
expropriation or nationalization of foreign investments rose, states 
began creating investment treaties, specifically BITs, to protect their 
investors. 30  These investment treaties were originally purposed to 
protect those rights of foreign investors in a host country, as protection 
generally encourages the proliferation of FDI because foreign investors 
would view their investments as less risky if they could enforce their 
rights through a treaty.31 Outside of investment treaties, most investors 
have little protection for their foreign investments against acts such as 
expropriation or nationalization by a host country, 32  but due to 
international investment agreements between states, investors can 
bring claims against host governments before an international arbitral 
tribunal rather than before the host country’s domestic courts.33 Most 
investment treaties now provide foreign investors a standard set of 
rights, including fair and equitable treatment and most-favored nation 
protections. 34  Even though international investment law is still 
relatively new, there has already been a sharp increase in international 
investment disputes in the past two decades.35 However, unlike trade, 
there is no international institution coordinating or regulating 
                                                                                                                       
27. Anderson, supra note 3, at 6. 
28. MOUYAL, supra note 23, at 7. 
29.  Barnali Choudhury, International Investment Law as a Global Public Good, 17 Lewis 
& Clark L. Rev. 481, 486 (2013) 
30. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 168-69 (2005). 
31. Id. See also SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING 
POLICY AND PRINCIPLE 116 (2008) (“Although there is no credible evidence to suggest that 
BITs have increased the flow of foreign investment from developed countries to developing 
countries, they certainly have instilled a sense of security in foreign investors.”). Cf. Jeswald W. 
Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 468 (2010) 
(noting the research that has questioned whether investment treaties do increase investment). 
32. Vandevelde, supra note 30. 
33. Christopher M. Ryan, Discerning the Compliance Calculus: Why States Comply with 
International Investment Law, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 63, 67 (2009). 
34. Franck, supra note 19, at 342. 
35. TONY COLE, THE STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION xiv (2013). 
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investment treaties, and the international investment regime remains 
governed by scattered measures and treaties.36 
A. Outer Sources of International Investment Law 
There are several sources of international law that influence 
international investment law. These sources do not bear directly on the 
discussion here, but are worth noting as they impact investment law in 
general. The first source is customary international law, often defined 
as customs that states follow from a sense of legal obligation.37 There 
are two general principles in customary international law relating to 
FDI: (1) principle of territorial sovereignty over which the state has 
exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) principle of nationality where each state 
has an interest in appropriate treatment of its citizens, both at home and 
abroad. 38  These principles of customary international law lay the 
foundation for FDI policies and are examples of the competing interests 
giving rise to investment law. Other principles of customary 
international law play a part in forming investment law, such as the 
principle of non-responsibility,39 and the principle that when private 
property is taken by the state, there must be compensation for that 
property (known as eminent domain).40 
A second source of influential regulations on FDI is soft law. 
“Soft law” is a special category of legal instructions, often perceived as 
standards.41 While the definition of soft law is broad and uncertain, it 
can generally be broken down into three categories: (1) nonbinding 
decisions of international organizations and bodies; (2) bilateral or 
multilateral agreements and declarations created together by states; and 
(3) recommendations by non-governmental organizations (NGOs).42 
These soft law norms are not legally obligatory, but can be part of the 
                                                                                                                       
36. GUIGUO WANG, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 16 
(2016). 
37. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1999). 
38. Rafael Leal-Arcas, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, 35 N.C. 
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 33, 74-75 (2009). 
39. Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 1269, 1277 (2009) (noting that the principle of non-responsibility encompasses 
where a state has legal obligations only to citizens of other states, and therefore, a claimant who 
is not a citizen of another contracting state would lack standing to bring a claim). 
40. COLLINS, supra note 25, at 29. 
41. Id. 
42. Laslo Blutman, In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law, 59 INT’L 
COMP. L. Q. 605, 608 (2010). 
2017] WORLD INVESTMENT COURT 9 
complex framework that regulates international activity and can greatly 
influence the conduct of international actors.43 Additionally, soft law is 
often defined and influenced by non-state actors, such as NGOs, and 
because of soft law’s growing influence over international hard law, 
these non-state actors are beginning to greatly affect international law 
as a whole.44 Some dislike the use soft law in regulating international 
arbitrators because it introduces uncertainty,45 but soft law has certain 
advantages in solving governance problems.46 
B. Proliferation of International Investment Agreements 
While these two sources described above may be influential, the 
most important regulations of FDI are international investment 
agreements (“IIA”), including BITs and free trade agreements 
(“FTA”). 47  While some international treaties either indirectly or 
tangentially regulate FDI, the first treaty to deal exclusively with 
investment was the 1959 Germany-Pakistan treaty. 48  Since then, 
primarily beginning in the 1990s, FDI has become an increasingly 
essential aspect of the international economy, and many states have 
liberalized their regulations to promote the flow of FDI, often through 
the creation of BITs.49 BITs are essentially treaties between a “home” 
state—state of the investor—and the “host” state—location of the 
investment—to establish the terms of investment and protection of 
FDI. 50  In the past, host countries were deemed open to FDI but 
generally considered unsafe for investment, and many home countries 
were concerned about potential discrimination against investors, 
                                                                                                                       
43. Id. 
44. Avnita Lakhani, The Role of Citizens and the Future of International Law: A Paradigm 
for A Changing World, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 159, 167 (2006). For a more detailed 
discussion on soft law and international arbitration, see generally Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 
Soft Law in International Arbitration: Codification and Normativity. 1 J. INT. DISP. 
SETTLEMENT 283 (2010). 
45. M.W. Reisman, Soft Law and Law Jobs, 2 J. INT’L DISPUTE 25, 25-26 (2011). 
46 . Jiangyu Wang, State Capitalism and Sovereign Wealth Funds, in ALTERNATIVE 
VISIONS, supra note 17, 405, 409. 
47. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 1-2 (2d ed., 2015). 
48 . Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 436 (2008). 
49. Jürgen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 
11 of NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 713, 720-23 (2002). 
50. Natasha Marusja Saputo, Paradoxical Pacts: Understanding the BIT Phenomenon and 
the Rejection of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 121, 123-24 
(2014). 
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including the expropriation, nationalization, or devaluation of 
investments. 51  From the host country’s perspective, a BIT seems 
essential to attracting foreign investors by providing reassurances 
against the potential loss of investment, and these converging interests 
lead to the proliferation of BITs between home and host countries with 
similar economic interests. 52  Within the past few decades, several 
multilateral FTAs, including the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”) and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (“ASEAN”), have subsequently emerged as regional 
investment treaties.53 
Over time, BITs have become more standardized and most 
contain strikingly similar parts or even identical language,54 as many 
IIAs are often drafted from several leading or model investment 
treaties.55 While the provisions in most investment treaties are similar 
in wording, the benefit of a BIT is that it allows for adjustment in each 
individual agreement. 56  BITs provide some flexibility for each 
contracting state to tailor the investment treaty to the relationship of the 
states’ economic needs. 57  However, almost all BITs contain four 
fundamental parts: (1) definition of investment, (2) treatment standard 
for investors, (3) protections from and compensation for expropriation 
or nationalization, and (4) a dispute resolution mechanism.58 Arguably, 
the most important provision contained in these BITs is the dispute 
resolution mechanism, discussed more below. Since the 1990s, 
international arbitration has become the preferred dispute resolution for 
both commercial and investment agreements.59 Under these dispute 
resolution mechanisms, states give their consent generally to submit 
                                                                                                                       
51 . See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 397-403 (2002) 
(discussing the rule requiring “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” in the event of 
expropriation by a host country). 
52. Chalamish, supra note 15, at 308-09. 
53. Id. at 330. 
54. Id. at 323. 
55. WANG, supra note 36, at 21. 
56. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1530 
(2005). 
57. Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of A 
Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 127-30 (2003). 
58. Saputo, supra note 50, at 128. 
59 . See NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN 
HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 810, at 469 (5th ed. 
2009) (“Whilst in 1998 ICSID registered eight cases with 19 pending, in 2008 it registered 31 
new cases with 128 pending.”). 
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future investment disputes before an arbitral tribunal to resolve actions 
relating the state’s authority over foreign investment.60 
C. Regionalism and FTAs 
Regional multilateral IIAs have initiated a step forward for 
international investment law. Generally, an FTA is an agreement 
between several states to reduce barriers to exports while protecting 
FDI through the creation of a more stable trade and investment 
setting.61  Probably the one of the most notable example of this is 
NAFTA, providing a complete regional agreement specifically 
protecting FDI.62 While not strictly an FTA, the European Union has 
many similar features to a regional investment agreement stemming 
from the combination of two provisions in the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community: Article 56—laying the foundation for the free 
movement of capital 63 —and Article 43—defining the freedom of 
establishment.64 The number of FTAs continues to grow, and recently 
included the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.65 However, 
it is worth noting that this past year, Great Britain left the European 
Union66 and the United States left the TPP,67 which may be signaling 
                                                                                                                       
60. See, e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (2009); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATY, art. 25 (2012) [hereinafter MBIT], https://www.state.gov/documents
/organization/188371.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NNJ-92WM] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017) (“Each 
Party consents to the submission of a claim to arbitration under this Section in accordance with 
this Treaty.”). 
61. Free Trade Agreements, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
http://trade.gov/fta/ [https://perma.cc/764T-96YX] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). 
62. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1101, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289. 
63. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 56, 1997 O.J. C 340/1, 3 
(prohibiting “all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member State and between 
Member States and third countries”). 
64. Id. art. 43, at 2 (prohibiting “restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals 
of a Member State in the territory of another Member State,” including “restrictions on the 
setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in 
the territory of any Member State”). 
65. Free Trade Agreements, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/79KD-HYDR] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). 
66. Stephen Erlanger, Britain Votes to Leave E.U.; Cameron Plans to Step Down, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexit-
european-union-referendum.html. 
67. Jeremy Diamond & Dana Bash, Trump signs order withdrawing from TPP, reinstate 
‘Mexico City policy’ on abortion, CNN (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/23/
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an international backlash to economic globalization, including that of 
FDI. 
III. CURRENT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
Without an enforcement mechanism, an investment treaty would 
be simply a political declaration lacking force.68 This is one of the 
revolutionary aspects of IIAs: the mechanism for foreign investors to 
enforce their rights against a foreign state.69 Most modern investment 
treaties now provide a substantive right for foreign investors to submit 
claims to an international arbitral tribunal.70 To enforce an IIA in the 
event of a violation by a state, a foreign investor must initiate the 
dispute resolution mechanism contained in the IIA.71 Usually, IIAs 
provide jurisdiction of investor-state disputes to either the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)72 or ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals.73 But consent to arbitrate is required for an arbitration 
to commence, and arbitral tribunals derive jurisdiction solely from the 
consent of the parties.74 
As IIAs are the general source of framework for the enforcement 
of FDI protection, the starting point of its enforcement is the scope of 
“investment” as defined in the investment treaty. Scholars have 
identified five generally-accepted characteristics of an investment: an 
investment (1) has a certain duration; (2) involves regular profit and 
return; (3) typically involves risk for both investor and host state; (4) 
requires substantial commitment; and (5) should be beneficial to the 
host state.75 Similar to this definition, some investment tribunals have 
followed the Salini test, derived from the decision in Salini v. 
                                                                                                                       
politics/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal-withdrawal-trumps-first-executive-action-monday-
sources-say/ [https://perma.cc/76TS-G927] (archived Oct. 21, 2017). 
68. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the 
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 477 (2009). 
69. Franck, supra note 19, at 343 (2007). 
70. SCHILL, supra note 1, at 244. 
71. Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration on A State’s 
Regulatory Autonomy Involving the Public Interest, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 245, 251 (2012). 
72. Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct 
Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 9 (2005). 
73. Stefan D. Amarasinha & Juliane Kokott, Multilateral Investment Rules Revisited, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 119, 148-50. 
74. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 131 
(1995) (“The consent of the two parties, both the governmental party and the investor, has been 
called the ‘cornerstone’ of ICSID’s jurisdiction.”). 
75. Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 72, at 12. 
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Morocco, 76  for the definition of “investment” for purposes of 
investment arbitral jurisdiction. 77  Under this Salini test, to be an 
“investment” the activity must: (1) involve the transfer of fund or the 
contribution of money or assets; (2) be of a certain duration; (3) have 
the individual transferring the funds participate in the management and 
risks; and (4) bring economic contribution to the host state.78 
The definition of “investment” has become incredibly broad and 
provides protection for most assets.79 We can look to the Model U.S. 
BIT to see that “investment” broadly means “every asset that an 
investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the 
characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the 
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or 
profit, or the assumption of risk.”80 Even the letter of submittal of the 
Mozambique-United States agreement noted that under the treaty 
“[e]very kind of investment is specifically incorporated in the 
definition.” 81  While this definition is relatively widespread among 
international investment treaties, the broad scope of “investment” still 
sparks controversy and has created divergent ideas of what the 
definition of investment should actually cover.82 
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A. Current Enforcement Regime: ICSID Convention and the New 
York Convention 
The current international investment regime is primarily enforced 
through two conventions: the ICSID Convention and the New York 
Convention. 83  The ICSID Convention is integral to the current 
investment framework because it has created a forum and set of rules 
specifically designed to address investor-state disputes.84 As of 2016, 
161 states have signed the Convention and 153 have deposited their 
instruments of ratification, making this Convention one of the more 
widely accepted international treaties.85 ICSID was formed with the 
purpose to “[p]rovide[] facilities for conciliation and arbitration of 
international investment disputes,” 86  and the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
extends to “any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment,”87 
making the definition of investment critical to the ability of the investor 
to initiate arbitration against a state.88 As noted above, once the scope 
of “investment” is determined, the arbitral tribunal would then have 
jurisdiction to review the dispute and hand down an award. 
Arbitration requires party consent for the tribunal to have 
jurisdiction, normally given in a contract between the parties. 89 
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.org/en/Pages/about/ICSID%20And%20The%20World%20Bank%20Group.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7ECS-FHML] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). 
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Nationals of Other States, art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter 
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88.  Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN 
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89 . Bart L. Smit Duijzentkunst & Sophia L.R. Dawkins, Arbitrary Peace? Consent 
Management in International Arbitration, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 139, 140 (2015). 
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However, unlike commercial arbitration, in investment arbitrations, 
IIAs provide the contracting state’s general consent to submit an 
investor-state dispute to arbitration, while the source of the investor’s 
consent is found through the request for arbitration.90 Generally, the 
parties have broad discretion to constitute the tribunals, usually 
consisting of an uneven number of arbitrators to decide the dispute.91 
Normally, each party appoints one arbitrator and those two arbitrators 
elect a third as the presider,92 and the arbitration proceeds according to 
the rules provided in the BIT, generally ICSID Rules, ICC Rules, or 
UNCITRAL Rules.93 Under the ICSID Convention, states can consent 
to arbitrate investment disputes through ICSID tribunals, 94  but an 
arbitral award given by an ICSID tribunal cannot be appealed and is 
deemed as a final judgment in the courts of a sovereign state.95 Once 
the award is given, the prevailing party must enforce the award in a 
state, and the ICSID Convention requires each Contracting State to 
recognize the award as binding and enforceable, providing only a very 
limited set of grounds for annulment of the award.96 Unlike the New 
York Convention, the ICSID Convention provides for annulment by 
application to the Secretary-General and a committee of three ad hoc 
arbitrators decide whether to annul the award, in full or in part.97 
However, some investment arbitrations can be resolved through a 
tribunal other than ICSID, in which the New York Convention98 would 
apply to enforcement of the award.99 Similar to the ICSID Convention, 
the New York Convention has widespread acceptance, with 156 
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contracting states as of 2016. 100  But whether the investor-state 
arbitration is under the New York Convention or the ICSID 
Convention, the tribunal is typically conducted in a similar manner and 
procedure. After the award is given, the New York Convention requires 
each contracting state to recognize the award as binding and to enforce 
an arbitral award. 101  While an arbitral award is binding under 
international law, it is not necessarily final, at least not until it is 
enforced by the state.102 The New York Convention provides a more 
permissive set of grounds for refusing enforcement in a state than the 
ICSID Convention, including refusal to enforce if the award is contrary 
to the public policy of the country,103 and the recognition procedure is 
completed through the domestic courts of the state rather than a 
centralized body.104 Taken together, the ICSID Convention and the 
New York Convention provide the enforcement and recognition 
procedures for international investment arbitration awards. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTING A WORLD INVESTMENT COURT 
At its core, investment arbitration is public international law, as 
arbitrators of an investor-state dispute analyze and often restrict 
sovereign governmental action. 105  Investment dispute resolution is 
functionally different from private commercial arbitration in the 
parties’ obligations at issue (namely the obligations that the host state 
agreed to in the investment treaty and the investor responsibilities), the 
parties’ relationship (a foreign investor against a state rather than both 
sides private parties),106  and the source of authority for arbitration 
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(2011). 
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(commercial arbitration arising from private contracts and investment 
arbitration arising from treaties). 107  Furthermore, investment 
arbitration is significantly distinct from private commercial arbitration 
because of the focus on a state’s actions, even described as a form of 
global administrative law. 108  Under these IIAs, states give general 
consent to resolve disputes with investors as a whole rather than 
disputes relating to a specific relationship or contract like in private 
commercial arbitration. 109  In consenting generally to all future 
investment disputes, the state is acting in its sovereign power, as only 
the state has the power to regulate FDI within its borders and, in effect, 
this submits the state to an outside adjudication of its own sovereign 
regulatory actions, resulting in what can be described as a “governing 
arrangement.”110 
To determine whether a World Investment Court would be more 
beneficial to the international investment regime than the current 
investment arbitral system, this Part will analyze the main reasons this 
proposed World Investment Court is necessary. The principle focus 
will be on the continuing conflict between legitimacy and sovereignty 
in international tribunals, the transparency (or lack thereof) of 
investment arbitrations, the independence of investment arbitrators, 
and the necessity of consistent and coherent interpretations. This 
Article will then make the argument that a World Investment Court 
would satisfy these principles more sufficiently than the current arbitral 
system, specifically in reinforcing the legitimacy of the system. 
A. Legitimacy vs. Sovereignty 
Investment arbitration, like most international tribunals, is 
criticized for what many deem a “legitimacy crisis,”111 one where the 
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most severe issue is the unpredictable and inconsistent investment 
arbitral awards. 112  In investment arbitration, there is a continuing 
conflict between state sovereignty and the legitimacy of the tribunal, as 
a sovereign state has the right to regulate foreign investment within its 
borders, but this regulation can infringe the rights of foreign investors 
and restrict a liberal economy that is necessary to increase wealth for 
both the home and the host countries.113 This conflict may be even 
more acute in the context of investment arbitration than in commercial 
arbitration as investment arbitration actually analyzes and determines 
the legality of a state’s sovereign action, which can directly infringe on 
state sovereignty. Many prominent critics of international judiciaries in 
general assert that formal international courts threaten state sovereignty 
and national principles.114 Even in this proposal for a World Investment 
Court, the conflict between legitimacy and sovereignty remains equally 
present. 
Sovereignty continues to be a contentious issue when states are 
asked to delegate powers to a supranational organization, particularly 
the idea that delegation will erode the powers of nation-states and even 
impact the legitimacy of the nation-states themselves.115 International 
investment law can threaten public law values, including democracy 
and sovereignty. 116  Investor-state arbitration is one such situation, 
where investors can bring claims against states before an international 
arbitral tribunal rather than domestic courts, often directly challenging 
a state’s power.117 But with the current increase in globalization, state 
borders are becoming a less significant barrier to cross-border 
investment, 118  and the traditional principle of state sovereignty is 
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constricting119 as our world moves more towards what Professor Philip 
Bobbitt calls the “market-state.”120 
As described above, international investment arbitration is 
distinct from the rest of international arbitration in the aspect that 
investment arbitration focuses significantly on public international 
law.121 The nature of an investment arbitral dispute is different than a 
private commercial arbitration, as the interests in investment disputes 
expand beyond the parties,122 including the effect of the award could 
force a state to alter its regulatory actions.123 Essentially, arbitrators 
interpret and apply public law to award damages as a remedy for 
investors based on the assessment of sovereign acts of a state under a 
broad standard of review.124 This far-reaching power of arbitrators in 
investment disputes can “undermine[ ] basic hallmarks of judicial 
accountability, openness, and independence.” 125  Because of this 
perceived threat to the sovereignty of nation-states, the overall 
legitimacy of international arbitral system can be challenged, and states 
may become protectionist by refusing to consent to investment 
arbitration at all. Professor José Alvarez identified several issues 
related to the legitimacy of the investment regime, and summarized his 
idea into this: “the international investment regime is the enemy of the 
state.”126 
But international tribunals, including investment arbitration and 
the World Investment Court proposed here, can be legitimate, and the 
reason for this proposal for a World Investment Court is founded on an 
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enhanced legitimacy claim. Because of the public-private law 
distinction, consistency plays a significant role in the legitimacy of the 
supranational institution. 127  The fragmentation 128  of international 
investment laws—particularly the proliferation of treaties and ad hoc 
tribunals—seems to threaten unity and coherence in international 
law,129 and has even been described as one of the “‘most worrying of 
modernity’s concerns’ for international lawyers.”130 
In our “new international economic order,” the ultimate goal is to 
enhance human welfare through the benefits of international relations, 
particularly wealth.131 Financial stability and international investment 
law are global public goods specifically because investment law guides 
FDI policies, promotes stability, and protects the benefits of both 
investors and states. 132  If we accept Professor Ronald Dworkin’s 
premise that each state has a general obligation to improve its own 
legitimacy and promote the status and wealth of their citizens, then 
because of the increasing growth and importance of FDI in this 
globalizing world, states have a duty to improve the overall 
international investment system.133 The legitimacy of states is then 
connected to the improvement of international law, including FDI. 
Because of the public law nature of foreign investment, FDI law is a 
public good,134 and even the World Bank provided in its Guidelines on 
the Treatment of FDI, that a “greater flow of foreign direct investment 
brings substantial benefits to bear on the world economy and on the 
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economies of developing countries in particular.”135 Therefore, if the 
improvement of international investment law can be done more 
effectively and efficiently through a supranational investment court, 
then states should contribute to creating this World Investment 
Court.136 In fact, there has been an increasing resistance to how BITs 
have been interpreted by ad hoc arbitrators far beyond the original 
meaning, a function which has caused some challenges to the current 
investment arbitral system.137 
An international court is legitimate when its authority is perceived 
as just, possessing some “quality that leads people (or states) to accept 
[its] authority . . . because of a general sense that the authority is 
justified.”138 Therefore, an international court is legitimate when it is 
“(1) fair and unbiased, (2) interpreting and applying norms consistent 
with what states believe the law is or should be, and (3) transparent and 
imbued with democratic norms.” 139  Legitimacy is connected to 
compliance or obedience, 140  and thus, the international law needs 
order, as order is essential to a just and stable global society.141 A 
World Investment Court would satisfy these legitimacy principles 
because it would promote consistent awards and a predictable legal 
framework for international investment law. With a consistent and 
coherent body of investment law, states would be more willing to 
accept the Court’s legitimacy and consent to and comply with its “just” 
authority. 
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Three principles that support an international court’s legitimacy 
are implicated here: (1) transparency and accountability, (2) 
impartiality, and (3) consistency or predictability, and many scholars 
believe investment arbitration suffers in each principles. 142  As 
discussed in this Part, these legitimacy challenges arise in each of these 
principles and predominantly lean in favor of establishing a World 
Investment Court. 
B. Transparency and Accountability 
One continuing issue with the current investment arbitral system 
is that proceedings and awards are often confidential.143 For example, 
UNCITRAL Rules require the consent of all the parties before an award 
or proceeding is made public,144 and ICSID proceedings are likewise 
private. 145  However, ICSID publishes the arbitral awards on its 
website,146 and many non-ICSID investment arbitral awards come to 
public view when the award is either challenged in domestic courts or 
when the state has to account for payment of an arbitral award.147 But 
the remaining problem is that the investment arbitral proceedings are 
private, even though most investment disputes are effectively public 
disputes. 148  Investment arbitration deals with international public 
law—judging the regulatory actions of a sovereign state—and an 
award against a state would affect that state’s citizens as well; 
therefore, this issue is significantly more pertinent to third parties than 
in the context of commercial arbitration.149 Private proceedings and ad 
hoc awards give limited public understanding of the arbitral procedures 
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and reasoning, and the potential public impact has increased this 
concern.150  A state is accountable to its people, and the legality of a 
state’s regulatory actions is a matter of public concern that should not 
be kept confidential.151 Additionally, public scrutiny would keep the 
appearance of accountability and impartiality on the part of the 
arbitrators, thereby removing some of the concern that arbitrators are 
generally pro-investor. As a symbol, openness is important as it 
demonstrates that neither the investor nor the state has something to 
hide.152 
A World Investment Court would resolve these transparency 
concerns, as a centralized investment court would be open in its 
proceedings to third parties and would publish its decisions and 
reasoning to the public. While confidentiality in commercial arbitral 
proceedings often has advantages, it is significantly less beneficial in 
investment arbitration when an award would affect an entire state and 
its people. Public proceedings and awards would additionally provide 
states with a general sense of the consequences for their future 
regulatory actions, as states could conform future actions to outcomes 
in decisions by the court in similar disputes. 
C. Tribunal Independence 
The independence of arbitrators is often a criticism many scholars 
focus on when discussing the problems of international arbitration.153 
But arbitrator integrity and impartiality in investment disputes is both 
necessary and possible.154 In arbitration, independence generally refers 
to a lack of improper connections, while impartiality refers to a lack of 
prejudgment, and “an arbitrator in international disputes must be both 
independent and impartial.”155 In the context of investment arbitration, 
because states usually have given a broad and general consent to 
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arbitrate, arbitrator integrity is increasingly necessary as awards 
substantially impact vital state interests.156 
The rapid growth of investment arbitration has led to increased 
criticism for an alleged lack of arbitrator impartiality or 
independence.157 Some scholars put forth this idea that arbitrators tend 
to favor investors in their awards, for the very reason that arbitrators 
only receive appointments when investors bring disputes, and investors 
will only initiate disputes if arbitrators are willing to award damages to 
investors.158 While plausible on its face, there is significant trouble 
accepting the argument that arbitrators are actually biased towards 
investors, and this assertion seems less persuasive when viewing 
counters to it. Here, my analysis in this Article, like several other 
scholars’, disagrees with Van Harten in investment arbitration 
analysis. 159  Particularly, investors will generally only bring claims 
before a tribunal if there is a significant chance of prevailing, as one 
has to balance the cost of arbitrating this dispute versus the likely 
outcome. This could account for many cases resolving in favor of the 
investor—if empirically cases actually did—as there must be a strong 
underlying reason for the dispute. In addition to general concerns, 
investors do not usually bring a suit against a state without due 
consideration, as states do not easily accept the result of an arbitral 
tribunal when that tribunal reviews the actions of state.160 
Investment arbitrations usually arise in extreme situations, and 
little correlation has been found that when investor protections 
increase, so do investment-disputes.161 There is also little empirical 
evidence to support the assertion that investment arbitrators lack 
impartiality or independence.162 However, some evidence points to the 
opposite, in that investors have won fewer investment arbitrations than 
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states.163 There is even evidence that some investment tribunals are 
becoming more deferential to states’ regulatory actions. 164 
Furthermore, a valuable professional reputation of an arbitrator is 
essential to the arbitrator being appointed,165 and a biased reputation 
for either party will not increase the number of appointments.166 
If arbitrators largely favored investors, states would have little 
incentive to negotiate BITs with arbitration as the dispute 
mechanism167 or states would simply denounce the investment arbitral 
system, as Bolivia and Ecuador recently did.168 In fact, Pakistan has 
stated they will no longer contain investment arbitration provisions in 
its BITs, and both South Africa and Indonesia have terminated existing 
BITs that contained investment arbitration provisions.169 Generally, 
most scholars disagree with the assertion that arbitrators are pro-
investor,170 and this assertion seems less than likely. Some scholars 
have even called this argument “myopic,” primarily because this view 
disregards the procedures and mechanisms already within the arbitral 
system to ensure impartiality.171 
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However, while there are several persuasive arguments that there 
is no reason to believe arbitrators lack independence or impartiality in 
investment arbitration, some believe it is “the mere appearance” of a 
conflict of interest or pro-investor bias that invites criticism of the 
current investment system.172 One such concern is that arbitrators are 
often also lawyers, and can represent a party in one investment dispute 
while serving as an arbitrator in a different investment dispute. This 
concerns many critics, including US Senator Elizabeth Warren, who 
has asserted that investment dispute resolution “could lead to gigantic 
fines, but it wouldn’t employ independent judges. Instead, highly paid 
corporate lawyers would go back and forth between representing 
corporations one day and sitting in judgment the next.”173 Additionally, 
recent high-profile challenges to arbitrator appointments have 
increased concern, 174  and over 200 economists and law professors 
signed a letter opposing the inclusion of investor-state dispute 
resolution in future international investment agreements.175 
Even if this perception is valid, the institution of a World 
Investment Court would solve this issue and increase the impartiality 
of the panel as the judges comprising the panel would simply be paid a 
salary regardless of the number of cases they heard, giving them little 
incentive to be pro-investor. Additionally, in this proposal, states would 
appoint these justices, and because states have conflicting interests—
need for protection from investment disputes and the need to protect 
their own investors in foreign states—this would require states to 
appoint fair and impartial judges rather than judges favoring either 
side.176 While the claim that arbitrators are partial to investors is not 
overly convincing, a panel of duly-appointed judges, ones indifferent 
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to how many cases they handle, would remove these critiques from the 
debate, and this perception of partiality—valid or not—would be 
extinguished. Referring back to the legitimacy principles above, to 
enhance an international court’s legitimacy, the judges must establish 
a reputation for neutrality and objectivity,177 and a World Investment 
Court would satisfy these principles. 
D. Inconsistent and Incoherent Interpretations of Investment Law 
Inconsistent decisions by arbitral tribunals threaten the legitimacy 
of investment arbitration.178 The necessity of consistent and coherent 
decisions is arguably the most persuasive critique of international 
investment arbitration and the primary reason for instituting a World 
Investment Court. Inconsistency provides a foundation for allegations 
of unfairness, in addition to creating a lack of predictability and 
reliability in the investment arbitral system.179 With the increase of 
investment disputes, there has been an increase of inconsistent arbitral 
decisions, where one tribunal interprets a provision or provides a 
judgment that conflicts with another tribunal’s decision. 180  When 
inconsistent decisions arise, FDI is again seen as risky, as unpredictable 
decisions can bring high costs to both investors and states. 181 
Investment treaties were created to promote FDI by providing 
protection to foreign investment and reducing risk;182 but inconsistent 
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decisions prevent this purpose from effectuating, making investment 
treaties less protective of foreign investment, and provide no direction 
for states to conform regulatory actions in the future.183 
There are several situations in which inconsistent decisions and 
interpretations can arise in international investment arbitration, 
including: (1) disputes involving the same facts, parties, and similar 
investment rights; (2) disputes involving similar situations and similar 
investment rights; (3) disputes involving different parties, different 
situations, but the same investment rights, 184  and (4) explicit 
disagreements with a prior arbitral award. 
The first situation can be shown in the well-known Lauder 
arbitrations, where two arbitral tribunals, one in Stockholm and one in 
London, came to conflicting decisions on the identical dispute. On the 
same set of facts, Lauder initiated an arbitration proceeding against the 
Czech Republic under the US-Czech Republic BIT185 while Lauder’s 
investment intermediary initiated an arbitration under the Netherlands-
Czech Republic BIT.186 While the expropriation standards under both 
BITs were functionally identical, the London tribunal held the 
investment was not expropriated, 187  while the Stockholm tribunal 
concluded the investment was expropriated, and ordered the Czech 
Republic to pay almost US$270 million.188 
Another prominent example of inconsistent awards is found in 
five cases filed by American companies under the Argentina-US 
BIT. 189  The cases surrounded the same governmental action—the 
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removal of stabilization measures during an economic crisis in 
Argentina—and Argentina argued that its actions satisfied the necessity 
defense under customary international law and the emergency clause 
under the Argentina-US BIT. 190  Three of the tribunals determined 
Argentina did not satisfy either defense, 191  but the remaining two 
tribunals concluded Argentina did satisfy the emergency defense 
provided in the BIT.192 But even the two tribunals who held in favor of 
Argentina applied the emergency defense differently.193 
Another example of a group of inconsistent decisions begins with 
Maffenzini v. Kingdom of Spain. 194   There, an Argentine national 
brought a request for arbitration against Spain under the Argentina-
Spain BIT, but the BIT required the investor to submit the claim to the 
Spanish domestic courts and allow eighteen months before initiating 
arbitration.195 However, the investor claimed the most-favored nation 
clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT allowed the use of the favorable 
treatment in the Spain-Chile BIT, which only required a six-month 
waiting period before arbitration could be initiated.196  The tribunal 
agreed with the investor, concluding the most-favored nation clause 
could extend to procedural matters such as the dispute resolution 
mechanism, and held the tribunal had jurisdiction over the claim.197 
Some have agreed that this is a defensible reading of the most-favored 
nation obligation in that the underlying purpose of the clause is to 
prevent states from discriminating against and between foreign 
investors.198 
However, in Salini Constutorri S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,199 two companies initiated arbitration 
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under the Italy-Jordan BIT, but in trying to avoid less desirable 
provisions, the companies attempted to invoke the most-favored nation 
clause to rely on the dispute resolution provisions in the Jordan-US and 
Jordan-UK BITs. 200  In doing so, the companies argued the most-
favored nation clause should apply to procedural provisions, citing the 
prior arbitral decision in Maffenzini.201 But the tribunal determined the 
companies could not rely on the most-favored nation provision to 
invoke the dispute resolution mechanisms in other BITs, and dismissed 
the case for lack of jurisdiction.202 The arbitral tribunal in Plama v. 
Bulgaria similarly determined that without an express confirmation in 
the investment treaty, a most-favored nation clause does not 
incorporate the dispute resolution mechanism of another investment 
treaty.203 
Tribunals can come to different conclusions even when 
interpreting the same provision. For example, S.D. Myers v. Canada204 
and Metalclad v. United Mexican States 205  were both cases under 
NAFTA, where the tribunals applied the “fair and equitable treatment” 
clause of the treaty inconsistently. In Metalclad, the tribunal 
determined the scope of the clause provided companies with a right that 
existed independent of the minimum standards of customary 
international law.206 Similarly, the tribunal in S.D. Myers held that for 
the provision to be violated “an investor has been treated in such an 
unjust or arbitrary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is 
unacceptable from the international perspective,”207 and therefore, the 
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provision was independent on customary international law. 208 
However, the tribunal in Methanex v. United States held that the fair 
and equitable treatment treaty standard did not integrate protections 
beyond customary law and that “non-discrimination” was not part of 
that international standard.209 
Even further confusing this line of decisions, the tribunal in Genin 
v. Estonia held that the “fair and equitable treatment” standard only 
proscribed a willful neglect of duty that was below international 
standards or had subjective bad faith.210  However, the tribunal in Pope 
& Talbot, Inc. v. Canada determined that provision imposed a higher 
standard of fairness.211 Yet another tribunal interpreted the clause to 
protect legitimate investor expectations as well.212 In fact, Metalclad 
still remains outlier due to its broad expropriation standard.213 
While generally considered rare, 214  explicit disagreements 
between tribunals prevent a fully coherent body of investment law. For 
example, the tribunals in SGS v. Pakistan215 and SGS Philippines216 
were presented with the same question: whether an ICSID tribunal has 
jurisdiction over an investor’s breach of contract claim even when there 
is an exclusive forum-selection clause.217 The two tribunals interpreted 
the construction of the umbrella clauses differently: SGS v. Pakistan 
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followed a restrictive approach where the foreign investor could only 
seek arbitration for breaches of contract resulting from foreign acts,218 
while SGS v. Philippines followed a broader interpretation, allowing 
foreign investors to use arbitration for relief for any breach of contract 
with the state, thereby going beyond customary international law.219 
However, the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines (which was subsequent to 
the decision in SGS v. Pakistan) did not try to distinguish or avoid 
inconsistency with the prior tribunal’s conflicting interpretation, but 
rather explicitly disagreed with the decision in SGS v. Pakistan.220 This 
divergence has only grown more widespread, as several later tribunals 
followed the decision in SGS v. Philippines,221 and others followed the 
decision in SGS v. Pakistan.222 In fact, referring back to the Metalclad 
and S.D. Myers, Inc. decisions above, tribunals following these awards 
have explicitly disregarded their reasoning, interpreting the “fair and 
equitable treatment” clause to constitute obligations only to the extent 
of customary international law, and not further.223 
E. Necessity of Consistent and Coherent Interpretations of IIAs 
These are just a few examples of the inconsistencies of investment 
arbitration, both in substantive and procedural interpretations of 
investment agreements. 224  While arbitrators are not bound by the 
decisions of other tribunals or even required to recognize prior awards, 
many arbitrators respect previous decisions and often integrate the 
prior award’s reasoning into their own judgments.225 Both parties and 
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arbitrators frequently cite to prior decisions for guidance or support.226 
Yet it is important to note that citation of a prior investment award does 
not necessarily mean influence,227 and tribunals keep away from any 
strict principle of stare decisis to allow flexibility in their decisions.228 
Some scholars argue that arbitrators in investor-state disputes should 
not adopt precedent solely because it came first, as this would impose 
a “decisional burden” on arbitrators, and these scholars would rather 
have arbitrators find the “right” rule rather than a consistent one.229 
This argument is predicated on the dynamic nature of international 
investment law and the “fragmented” system of BITs. 230  But this 
current system, where two awards on the same set of facts and under 
similar BITs can create two separate outcomes such as in the Lauder 
arbitrations, “shocks the sense of rule of law or fairness.”231 
Consistent and coherent interpretation is essential to 
legitimacy,232 and incoherent rules of law have created a challenge to 
the legitimacy of investment arbitration. One arbitral tribunal’s 
interpretation of a procedural or substantive right or the scope of 
“investment” in a BIT has a direct impact on subsequent arbitrations, 
not only under the same BIT but under other investment treaties with 
similar language or provisions.233 Consistency requires that a rule be 
applied uniformly in every similar or applicable situation,234 a principle 
the WTO Appellate Body has embraced. 235  Similarly, coherence 
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relates to the principle that the system should make sense as a whole, 
and the principle of coherence is integral to the order of international 
law because coherence forms a well-organized structure. 236  But 
different interpretations of essentially identical provisions in similar or 
the same BIT—such as the scope of most-favored nation provisions 
discussed above—create a lack of coherence and threaten the 
legitimacy of the investment dispute system.237 However, a central 
World Investment Court would prevent multiple proceedings where 
investors initiate arbitrations under different BITs hoping to win under 
at least one. Looking to the Lauder arbitrations, this multiplicity 
problem leads to inconsistent decisions on the same set of facts and 
denigrates the legitimacy of the system. 238  Due to the public law 
underpinnings of international investment, consistency should be 
pursued.239 
Some have suggested that “inconsistency” actually enhances 
predictability and allows flexibility in the arbitral system when 
needed.240 This inconsistency, it is argued, can identify flaws in the 
system and allow for improvements leading to positive changes, 
providing a “more considered jurisprudence,”241 an assertion similar to 
the “right decision” argument. While the flexibility argument may 
pertain to commercial arbitration where consistent rules are not 
necessary because disputes are fact-driven, based on contract 
interpretation, and focused only on the isolated dispute between the 
parties, 242  the argument does not apply equally to international 
investment arbitration, primarily because disputes are focused on 
regulatory actions of a state. 243 Private commercial arbitration is solely 
between the parties, while the investment agreements allow the states 
to be subject to any future investor-state dispute, and the treaty may be 
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the subject to many investment arbitrations, such as the Argentina-US 
BIT after its economic crisis.244 
Additionally, as described above, most BITs have the same or 
substantially similar language and the international system of BITs are 
not as fragmented as some may believe. 245  This convergence in 
language and protection is influencing a multilateralization of 
investment agreements.246 A system of precedent with an appellate 
body, like the one suggested in this Article, would be able to promote 
consistency; yet at the same time, precedent can be overturned, which 
can still allow for the “right” decision.247 Even domestic courts do not 
simply apply strict stare decisis to their cases, but can reverse their 
earlier rulings through careful and clear reasoning.248 This needs to be 
done at the international level, as the legitimacy of the investment 
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regime matters more than the potential “correctness” of a single 
result.249 
The purpose of this proposed World Investment Court would be 
to create consistency and centralize the Court around tenured judges 
rather than new arbitrators each dispute. There are many benefits to 
consistency in international investment law, including equality in 
investment protection, predictability in award outcomes, and enhanced 
legitimacy of the international regime.250  This ideal of consistency 
promoted here is based on this empirical information and the necessity 
of consistent interpretation of similar wordings. Arbitrators in a sense 
are lawmakers,251 but unlike private arbitration, investment law creates 
a distinct impact on both the theoretical sphere—state sovereignty—
and the practical sphere—as an award against a state likewise affects 
all people within its boundaries. The legitimacy of these arbitral 
tribunals can be improved by the creation of a well-developed 
jurisprudence.252 
The WTO dispute settlement system is one of the most effective 
international judiciaries. 253  The Appellate Body of the WTO has 
already greatly contributed to the coherence of trade law and 
organizational integrity,254 and this predictability based on a coherent 
body of law allows states to rely on past decisions and anticipate the 
outcome of future disputes.255 One of the predominant reasons the 
WTO dispute system is so popular compared to other international 
courts is the high consistency of the Appellate Body and its coherent 
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commitment to precedent.256 As the jurisprudence of the WTO has 
steadily become consistent, the number of cases brought has also 
declined.257 This proposed World Investment Court would be a major 
leap forward in creating a coherent body of international investment 
law and enhancing the legitimacy of the international investment 
framework.258 
However, the consistency proposed here would not necessarily be 
consistency in substance of awards, as two similar cases can have 
different outcomes and still be consistent. The benefit of consistency 
that would be realized by a World Investment Court would be the 
consistency in procedure in addition to consistency in interpretation of 
similar or identical provisions. Yet consistency must be in the 
independent check for legal correctness, not simply consistency 
itself. 259  This consistency in correct legal procedure and accurate 
interpretation, but not necessarily in substance, would ensure the 
protection of foreign investments while still maintaining a flexibility 
towards the substance of disputes. By doing so, the proposed appellate 
body of the World Investment Court would make international 
investment dispute resolution more democratic and ensure the 
independence and impartiality of the judges.260 
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST WORLD INVESTMENT COURT AND 
RESPONSES TO THESE CRITICISMS 
While a World Investment Court would produce substantial 
benefits in the rule of law, consistency, and predictability, all vital in 
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international investment law, there may be some trade-offs for these 
benefits.261 Many have been critical of Van Harten’s proposal for an 
international investment court, 262  and have put forth several 
countervailing arguments against this proposed World Investment 
Court. 
A. Policies Against a World Investment Court 
The most concerning of these arguments is the idea that a global 
investment court would restrict the sovereignty of states more than the 
current arbitral system. 263  Generally, states prefer international 
arbitration because it provides at least some control over the 
appointment of arbitrators on the panel, unlike with permanent 
courts. 264  Furthermore, some believe this constant pursuit of 
consistency may lead to a court with little accountability to the states, 
which in turn could greatly effect a state’s economy.265 The pursuit of 
consistency may lead to a decrease in accuracy and sincerity, as judges 
would be more deferential to precedent rather than simply focusing on 
getting the decision correct,266 leading some to say we should abandon 
this principle of consistency to focus on the quality of arbitral 
decisions.267 
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Similarly, while a World Investment Court may create 
consistency in decisions—beneficial though it may lead to lowering 
FDI risk and giving states a framework for future actions—it could also 
enhance legitimacy concerns, as this would increase the concern that 
an international court would develop international law and create 
precedent states do not approve.268 This argument is based on the same 
idea that a permanent court may be less deferential to state sovereignty, 
and could make the system less attractive to the states, and in turn, less 
legitimate.269 Indeed, Professor Stephen Schill argues that investor-
state arbitration is worth keeping despite its flaws because it better 
balances accountability of states with a limited invasion of their 
sovereignty.270 Finally, while a permanent panel of judges may bring 
an increased sense of impartiality, the problem lies with determining 
who would appoint the panel that would be considered by all to be 
legitimate.271 
B. Responses to these Criticisms 
Again, this Article is not proposing that the current system is not 
legitimate, nor does it suggest the problems international investment 
law has are too significant to overcome. While the current investment 
system has some problems that need attention, principally 
unpredictability and incoherence, many believe “a solution will come 
with the passage of time.”272 This Article instead proposes that a World 
Investment Court with tenured judges would be that solution, resolving 
many of the criticisms against the current arbitral system and creating 
a more perfect dispute resolution framework.273 
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The two counterarguments to an investment court above rely on 
the valid concern that independent judges would infringe on the 
sovereignty of states because they are no longer directly accountable to 
the states. If judges are tenured and do not need to satisfy the parties 
for repeat appointments, this could give little incentive to actually 
appeal to the states and their sovereignty. These arguments are valid 
and can give rise to concerns, but there are solutions to ensure there is 
less chance of this occurring. 
But there are many practical benefits to having a World 
Investment Court with tenured judges, which overcome this perceived 
disadvantage of less accountability to states. 274  This lesser 
accountability may actually be beneficial to international law as a 
whole, because rather than focusing on pleasing the states or investors, 
the judges will be focused on attaining the right result, as a judge’s job 
is to make the international investment agreement the best vehicle for 
achieving the purpose it was designed to serve.275 
But simply because a judge is independent does not mean that 
judges have no constraints on their actions.276  Professors Laurence 
Helfer and Anne-Maurie Slaughter have provided a compelling theory 
of “constrained independence,” where even after the independent 
tribunal is created, states can still have a second-level control to prevent 
judicial overreach.277 There are practical ways to check this court in the 
structure, including having shorter tenure along with political control 
mechanisms. Furthermore, just as reputation promotes state 
compliance with dispute resolution awards,278  a good reputation is 
necessary for judges, otherwise states would refuse to consent to the 
World Investment Court’s jurisdiction, just as some have with the 
current investment arbitral system. Additionally, as proposed in this 
Article, states would appoint these judges through the WTO, and due 
to states’ conflicting interests in investment protection, they would be 
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inclined to appoint impartial judges to the Court. In sum, this Article 
hopefully demonstrates the benefits outweigh the costs of a World 
Investment Court and constructs a reliable system, so in the future the 
WTO can do the same. 
VI. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT COURT OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
Notably, the European Union and Canada recently agreed to 
develop a permanent investment court under the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement to better protect 
investment and resolve investment disputes,279 and the European Union 
and Vietnam recently concluded a BIT which included an investment 
court.280 In 2015, prior to these agreements, the European Commission 
issued its Concept Paper to the United States proposing the reform of 
the current arbitral system under the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (“TTIP”), suggesting the formation of an 
international investment court. 281  Many, including the European 
Union, have noted this is a radical change from the current system of 
international investment dispute resolution, but one the European 
Union is attempting to spread. 282 The final goal of this proposal is to 
make this tribunal, along with the E.U.-Vietnam tribunal and the TTIP 
court, into a multilateral investment court and replace all investment 
dispute resolution mechanisms in E.U. investment agreements.283 
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A. Construction of the TTIP Investment Court System 
This Article will not describe in detail the proposed TTIP or other 
EU investment court systems, as the actual future construction of the 
court is yet unknown, as negotiations are ongoing at this time. But it 
would be useful to look at some of the proposed aspects of the courts 
and the critiques surrounding them. In the TTIP Concept Paper to the 
United States, the proposed court would be comprised of a Court of 
First Instance consisting of fifteen judges total, five nationals of the 
United States, five nationals of the European Union, and five nationals 
of third countries.284 These judges would be tenured for six-year terms 
renewable once, and all must have the “qualifications required in their 
respective countries for appointment to judicial office, or be jurists of 
recognised competence.”285 The Court of First Instance will hear cases 
in panels of three judges randomly appointed by the President of the 
Tribunal, with one judge each from the United States, the European 
Union, and a third country, and chaired by the judge from a third 
country.286 Additionally, these judges would each be paid a monthly 
retainer fee, which may be turned into a salary.287 
In a few respects, the Court of First Instance borrows some its 
structure from arbitration. For example, the panel would be comprised 
similarly to an arbitral panel, as one judge each will be from each 
party’s country, one party will be from the United States and the other 
from the European Union, with a third-country (presumably neutral) 
judge presiding. Similarly, the rules of the court do not necessarily 
differ greatly from that of an arbitration, as the proposal allows 
claimants to submit disputes to the Tribunal under ICSID Rules, 
UNCITRAL Rules, or any other rules agreed to by the parties.288 But 
where it varies substantially is in the composition of the panel, as the 
parties have significantly less influence over the appointment process. 
But the greatest difference—and arguably the most significant 
benefit—is the appellate procedure. The Appellate Tribunal would be 
comprised of six judges, two from the United States, two from the 
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European Union, and two from third countries, appointed for six year 
terms.289 Like the Court of First Instance, the appellate panel hearing 
disputes would consist of three justices, one from each category, and 
chaired by the national of a third country.290 Either party may appeal 
the decision of the Court of First Instance within 90 days, but the 
grounds for appeal are limited to: (1) that the Tribunal erred in the 
interpretation or application of the applicable law; (2) that the Tribunal 
manifestly erred in the appreciation of the facts, or (3) those provided 
for in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.291 If the appeal is rejected, 
the award is final, but the Appeal Tribunal may reverse or modify the 
legal findings or conclusions.292 Once the award is final, it is binding 
and the Parties must recognize and enforce the award, which is not 
subject to any annulment procedure.293 
B. Potential Issues of the Proposed E.U. Permanent Investment Court 
While the Permanent Investment Court under the TTIP and EU 
BITs is a bold move forward, some scholars have noted problems with 
the forthcoming bilateral investment courts.294 The most significant 
issue is that the Court is only bilateral, primarily because, while the 
hope of the European Commission is to create a multilateral court, the 
composition of the Proposed Court—third of the justices from 
European Union and third of the justices from the United States—may 
actually solidify its bilateral nature and make it increasingly difficult to 
replace in the future.295 Additionally, the proposed investment court 
fails to integrate domestic courts in the dispute resolution, as foreign 
investors can skip pursuing remedies in the domestic court and simply 
go to the permanent investment court, giving foreign investors a 
potential advantage over domestic investors.296 Other concerns stem 
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from the high costs, the institution of the court, and the initiation of the 
court’s jurisdiction. 297  The proposed international investment court 
under the TTIP and the other EU BITs would need to address these 
issues, particularly those problems in the structural design, if it does 
not want to prevent a multilateral permanent investment court in the 
future. It is an imperfect solution to a difficult problem, but a problem 
that can be addressed through a multilateral investment court.298 
A truly World Investment Court would address most of the 
concerns the TTIP Proposal elicits. Broadening the membership of the 
investment court would make appointing the judges more democratic, 
and would resolve the entrenchment or additional obstacle problem 
noted by Professor Schill. But the World Investment Court must begin 
as multilateral to address these concerns. Many of the other concerns 
deal directly with the E.U. BITs rather than the court itself, such as the 
potential “advantage” of not pursuing domestic remedies first, and 
these concerns would have to be addressed in the investment 
agreements. Additionally, the Appellate Panel would be able to satisfy 
the consistency concern, as over time, the court can develop a 
consistent and coherent definition and application of provisions such 
as the most-favored nation clause or the scope of “investment.”299 
VII. CONSTRUCTION OF THIS PROPOSED WORLD 
INVESTMENT COURT 
As described above, predictability and security in the international 
regime are beneficial—and arguably necessary—to the formation of 
international law.300 This Part will describe an idea of how a World 
Investment Court in practice could be instituted and operated. While 
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the model proposed under the TTIP provides a viable reference point 
to begin this hypothetical investment court, this proposed court would 
be created to address the current concerns over the proposed E.U. 
investment court system. To begin, the investment court should 
preferably be created under the auspices of the WTO, as there currently 
is no supranational entity for regulating FDI, and the closest regulatory 
organization would be the WTO. Additionally, while history has kept 
investment and trade from being regulated jointly, both are 
connected,301  as our global economy is based on two foundations: 
international trade and international investment,302 and FDI plays a 
fundamental role in the global economy.303 
A. Structure and Appointment 
Like many modern international tribunals, this World Investment 
Court would not be a judicial court in the domestic sense. Similar to 
the court currently under the WTO, this proposed World Investment 
Court would consist of a Lower Court and an Appellate Body. The total 
number of judges on the Lower Court is arbitrary at this stage in this 
hypothetical court, so long as the number is a multiple of three. But due 
to the multilateral nature of this proposed court and the growing 
number of investment disputes, the number of judges would need to 
correspondingly increase. These judges would be appointed through 
the WTO by the contracting states, as the appointment procedure would 
need to be controlled by a committee of states to ensure “that the ISDS 
system is subject to democratic control, to be exercised jointly by the 
contracting parties.”304 
Regarding length of term, tenure preferably would be six years, 
non-renewable and a third of the judges’ terms staggered every other 
year, similar to the European Court of Justice.305 A shorter term of 
service would arguably address the concerns states may have regarding 
the accountability problem discussed above. States may be concerned 
that these independent judges would be indifferent to encroachments 
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on state sovereignty, but a relatively shorter term would allow the 
contracting states to appoint judges perceived to be more balanced 
towards state sovereignty and investor protection. 306  Yet the non-
renewable factor will maintain the independence of the judges, as there 
is little incentive to be partial to either side when there is no way to 
extend a judge’s tenure and no way to remove a judge in retaliation. 
The Appellate Body would be comprised of nine justices, with the 
entire panel hearing appeals from the Lower Court. Its power would be 
broadened from the current annulment grounds, allowing the Appellate 
Body to modify or reverse legal findings or conclusions from the Court 
of First Instance, similar to the current provision in the EU-Vietnam 
BIT.307 But another significant deviation from the current system is the 
appointment process. Presumably, the WTO Secretariat or another 
position created to oversee the investment court would propose several 
candidates, and those candidates would be approved by the contracting 
states to the WTO.308 The rationale behind requiring a broad consensus 
is that states give their general consent to all future disputes under 
investment treaties, and there is no certainty to if and when a state or a 
state’s investor would be before the investment court. Therefore, all the 
contracting states would have an interest in appointing the judges. 
The most significant difference here to the investment courts 
proposed under the EU BITs would be the multilateral nature of this 
proposed permanent global investment court. Numerous criticisms 
towards the proposed investment court under the TTIP and EU BITs 
are that the court is bilateral and may actually harm future expansions 
to a multilateral one. The WTO would be the best place to establish this 
World Investment Court,309 as most countries are contracting states. 
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Beginning with a multilateral investment court under the WTO would 
resolve at least most of these concerns and provide a solid foundation—
including establishing the court’s legitimacy—for the future legal 
disputes brought before the court. 
B. Rules and Precedent 
Similar to the WTO Appellate Body now, the World Investment 
Court appellate body would draw up its own working procedures rather 
than follow the TTIP and EU proposals.310 Once the Appellate Body is 
formed, the tenured members of the panel would create its own 
procedure in consultation with the WTO Secretary-General. This 
includes setting time-limits and procedures, such a presenting evidence 
to the Appellate Body, and the procedure for rotation of judges to hear 
appeals.311 
Precedent is another issue that needs to be discussed, as this is the 
foundation for consistency and a coherent body of law. Arbitrators 
already frequently reference and cite previous investment awards 
creating a type of de facto persuasive precedent, 312  but this still 
produces inconsistent decisions as not all arbitrators follow this 
principle.313 However, in this proposed World Investment Court, the 
Appellate Body would review the Lower Court’s legal judgments de 
novo and jurisdiction of the Appellate Body would generally be limited 
to the issues of law. Judgments would be published, and like the 
WTO, 314  prior decisions would be given persuasive precedential 
authority for subsequent cases in the Lower Court on issues of the 
law,315 providing the Lower Court a framework of legal authority on 
which to decide disputes brought to the Court.316 This type of precedent 
                                                                                                                       
For a general discussion of the connection between trade and international investment, see 
generally KURTZ, supra note 163. 
310. See WTO Disupute Settlement Understanding, supra note 308, art. 17(9). 
311. MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 207. 
312. SCHILL, supra note 1, at 321-23. 
313. Supra section IV(d). 
314. Joost Pauwelyn, Minority Rules: Precedent and Participation, in ESTABLISHING 
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, supra note 122, at 141, 146-47. 
315. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014, 1017 (2007) (“Precedent, or stare decisis, refers the doctrine under 
which a court, when deciding a point of law, generally follows a holding of a prior court on that 
point if that prior court is equal or superior in the judicial hierarchy.”). 
316 . Gary Born, International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 847 (2012) (“[T]he 
tribunal’s awards were published and provide frequently cited authority on a range of 
international-law issues, including expropriation, nationality, remedies, and procedures.”). 
48 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:1 
where the Court would stick to its prior decisions absent compelling 
reasons would contribute to a more consistent and coherent body of 
investment law, yet would allow the Lower Court to decide or 
distinguish prior decisions based on the facts and specific issues in the 
case. Yet when it comes to issues such as whether the most-favored 
nation clause applies to procedural provisions,317 there would be a 
consistent application of this precedent of law to the facts of the 
specific dispute. 
C. Will This Court Ever Happen? 
While this World Investment Court may “seem too ambitious to 
be politically feasible” to some318 or even impossible,319 with the recent 
proposals by the European Union for the creation of bilateral 
investment courts, there appears to be growing political will for a 
World Investment Court. FDI flows continue to increase, and many are 
looking for improvements to the current investment arbitral system. 
This Article proposes that a World Investment Court is that 
improvement. 
To solve cooperation dilemmas between states, states tend to turn 
to international courts as functional solutions to overcome problems 
through collective coordination and to promote the states’ 
legitimacy.320 International institutions are created because states will 
be better off by committing themselves to a set of common rules and 
principles.321  While many highly doubt the probability of a World 
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Investment Court’s implementation,322 claiming the political will is 
just not sufficient for a multilateral agreement on this issue,323 there is 
a growing hope that this court could be implemented in the near 
future.324 In the past few decades, the political influence and strength 
of international law has increased, and international courts have exerted 
significant influence on legal developments.325 
Certainly, it will be difficult to create this proposed World 
Investment Court. Practically, this would require the creation of new 
Secretariat positions and panels to expand the capacity of the WTO.326 
Politically, it may require amendment of the WTO Agreements to 
include investment under the organization’s jurisdiction,327 and states 
will not create or consent to the jurisdiction of a court unless they 
benefit from it, namely by forcing other states to appear before the 
court. 328  But difficulty in practice should not prevent the 
implementation of a better system, and as this Article proposes the 
World Investment Court to be instituted under the WTO, the Court 
could be created through that process rather than as a free-standing 
body, at least until a supranational organization is tasked with the 
regulation of foreign investment. 
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There is a strong case for the implementation of a World 
Investment Court under the WTO.329 The WTO has broad consensus, 
and while it has not always been successful in negotiating previous 
investment agreements,330 there are several factors that may ignite this 
“political will.” First, this proposal would give states control over the 
appointment process rather than giving both investors and states 
control.331 And as states have conflicting interests in appointing judges, 
because states want to protect themselves from suits while 
simultaneously protecting their own investors against infringements by 
other countries, this would ensure impartial and independent judges are 
appointed. 332   
International legal crises play an important role in the formation 
of an international court due to challenges to an existing legal 
regime. 333  With the growth of investment disputes and the rising 
number of inconsistent decisions, the underlying foundation of 
investment arbitration is currently being challenged. Furthermore, this 
centralization of investment disputes would provide consistency and 
coherence for states to know interpretations of their IIAs to better 
protect themselves from claims. So while “mustering the political will 
to enact and ratify such a convention might well prove taxing,” it is “by 
far the most practical approach.”334 There seems to be at least some will 
“mustering” as the European Union, Vietnam, and Canada have all 
agreed to a permanent investment court, so a future multilateral 
investment court is a more likely proposition than it was a decade 
ago.335 But even once the Court is created, the legitimacy of the court 
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may still be founded on its continuing success and how the Court 
accomplishes its proposed functions.336 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes what is hoped to be a convincing argument 
for the establishment of a World Investment Court designed to resolve 
investment disputes brought by foreign investors against states. FDI 
continues to be a fundamental pillar of our global economy, and 
consistent and coherent decisions are necessary to protect investor 
rights and promote the flow of foreign investment while providing 
states with a framework of laws on which to base future regulatory 
actions. Because of the public-law nature of investment dispute 
resolution, consistency is essential to the legitimacy of a dispute 
resolution body, and a World Investment Court created under the WTO 
would not only create a more consistent body of international 
investment law, but would firmly promote the legitimacy of the 
international investment regime. It would also enhance the 
multilateralization of the current investment system by further 
establishing a more uniform international legal framework that is 
coherent and stable.337 
While international investment law is still in its infancy,338  it 
seems to be moving in the right direction. With the proposal to create 
a bilateral investment court under the EU treaties, more countries may 
be enticed to adopt this practice. These proposals have been met with 
harsh criticisms from scholars, but these critiques can aid in forming a 
fully-functioning World Investment Court, primarily one that begins as 
a multilateral court rather than under a single BIT. As international law 
matures, the visibility of its legitimacy must increase, including the 
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public perception of arbitrator independence and predictability in its 
body of law.339 This proposed World Investment Court will benefit 
both investors and states, and states would have an interest in this court 
as it should advance both their individual interests and the legitimacy 
of international investment law as a whole.340 
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